Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2005

State of Utah v. Brandon Williams : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Richard Gale; Counsel for Appellee.
Karen A. Klucznik; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff Attorney General; Timothy L.
Taylor; Counsel for Appellant .
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Williams, No. 20050098 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5554

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 20050098-CA
BRANDON WILLIAMS,
Defendant/Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM ORDER DISMISSING POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE IN A DRUG-FREE ZONE (WITH PRIORS) CHARGE, A FIRST
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)00,
(2)(c), (4)(c) (West 2004), AND BINDING DEFENDANT OVER INSTEAD
ON POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA IN A DRUG-FREE ZONE
CHARGE, A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE
ANN. $ 58-37a-5(l) (West 2004), IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
UTAH COUNTY, THE HONORABLE STEVEN L. HANSEN PRESIDING

RICHARD GALE
Utah County Public Defenders
245 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84601
Counsel for Appellee

KAREN A. KLUCZNIK (7912)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Attorney General
Utah Attorney General's Office
160 East 300 South
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
TIMOTHY L. TAYLOR
Utah County Deputy Attorney
Counsel for Appellant

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
CaseNo.20050098-CA

v.
BRANDON WILLIAMS,
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM ORDER DISMISSING POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE IN A DRUG-FREE ZONE (WITH PRIORS) CHARGE, A FIRST
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. $ 58-37-8(2)(a),
(2)(c), (4)(c) (West 2004), AND BINDING DEFENDANT OVER INSTEAD
ON POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA IN A DRUG-FREE ZONE
CHARGE, A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE
ANN. § 58-37a-5(l) (West 2004), IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
UTAH COUNTY, THE HONORABLE STEVEN L. HANSEN PRESIDING

RICHARD GALE
Utah County Public Defenders
245 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84601
Counsel for Appellee

KAREN A. KLUCZNIK (7912)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Attorney General
Utah Attorney General's Office
160 East 300 South
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
TIMOTHY L. TAYLOR
Utah County Deputy Attorney
Counsel for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

1

ISSUES ON APPEAL

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

4

ARGUMENT
THE MAGISTRATE ERRED IN APPLYING SHONDEL WHEN HE
CONCLUDED THAT METHAMPHETIMINE FOUND IN THE RESIDUE
OF A PLASTIC BAGGIE COULD ONLY SUPPORT A POSSESSION OF
DRUG PARAPHERNALIA CHARGE, NOT A POSSESSION OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE CHARGE, WHERE THE STATUTES
DEFINING THOSE CRIMES DO NOT CRIMINALIZE "EXACTLY THE
SAME CONDUCT"
5
CONCLUSION

11

ADDENDA
Addendum A - Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, & Order
Addendum B - Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-4
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5
Addendum C - State v. Sorensen, 1003 UT App 292

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATE CASES
State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, 52 P.3d 1210,
cert, denied, 537 U.S.I 172 (2003)

6, 10

State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257 (Utah 1985)

6, 7, 10

State v. Federowicz, 2002 UT 67, 52 P.3d 1194,
cert, denied, 537 U.S. 1123 (2003)

6, 10

State v. Gomez, 722 P.2d 747 (Utah 1986)

6

State v. Green, 2000 UT App 33, 995 P.2d 1250

6, 10

State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983)

9

State v. Kent, 945 P.2d 145 (Utah App. 1997)
State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969)

1, 6,10
3, 4, 5

State v. Sorensen, 2003 UT App 292

9

State v. Vigh, 871 P.2d 1030 (Utah App. 1994)

7

State v. Warner, 788 P.2d 1041 (Utah App. 1990)

7

STATE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (West 2004)

2

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-3 (1999)

8

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-4 (2002)

10

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-4 (West 2004)

2, 3

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (West 2004)

2, 8, 9

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (West 2004)

1
ii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
CaseNo.20050098-CA
BRANDON WILLIAMS,
Defendant/Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The State appeals from an order dismissing a charge of possession of a controlled
substance in a drug-free zone (with priors), a first degree felony. This Court has pourover jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(i) (West 2004).
ISSUE ON APPEAL
Did the magistrate err in applying Shondel when he concluded that
methamphetamine found in the residue of a plastic baggie could only support
a possession of drug paraphernalia charge, not a possession of a controlled
substance charge, where the statutes defining those crimes do not criminalize
"exactly the same conduct"?
Standard of Review. "[R]eview under the Shondel rule focuses on the trial
court's legal conclusions, which [this Court] review[s] under a correction-of-error
standard, according no particular deference to the trial court's ruling." State v. Kent, 945
P.2d 145, 146 (Utah App. 1997) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

Preservation. This issue was preserved by the State's objection to the
magistrate's dismissal of the felony charge of possession of a controlled substance in a
drug-free zone. (R. 80-85; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, & Order attached at
Addendum A).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutory provisions are attached at Addendum B:
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (West 2004);
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-4 (West 2004);
Utah Code Ann. $ 58-37a-5 (West 2004).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
Defendant was charged by amended information with one count of possession of a
controlled substance in a drug-free zone with prior convictions, a first degree felony, and
absconding, a third degree felony (R. 59-60).
At defendant's preliminary hearing, Utah County Deputy Sheriff Daniel Forester
testified that he arrested defendant on July 29, 2004, after defendant failed to return to jail
as ordered (R. 129:5-6). Incident to arrest, Deputy Forester searched defendant and
found, in defendant's front pocket, a plastic baggie containing a substance that appeared
to be methamphetamine (R. 129:7). The substance field-tested positive for
methamphetamine (Id). The state crime lab confirmed that result (Id.).
On cross-examination, Deputy Forester confirmed that the crime lab did not weigh
the methamphetamine, but rather, only concluded that "[m]ethamphetamine was
identified in the residue in the plastic bag" (R. 129:15-16). Deputy Forester
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acknowledged that the crime lab usually weighs the substance if there is a sufficient
amount to weigh (R. 129:15).
Deputy Forester testified that defendant was within 15000 feet of a public park and
a church when he was arrested (R. 129:8). In addition, the State presented two final
judgments recording defendant's prior convictions on drug-related charges (R. 129:16).
After the evidence was presented, defendant moved to dismiss the first degree
felony possession of methamphetamine charge under State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343,
453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), and to bind defendant over instead on a misdemeanor
possession of paraphernalia charge (R. 129:16-18; R. 83). Defendant argued that such a
result was proper because one of the statutory factors the trier-of-fact "should consider in
determining whether an item is paraphernalia . . . is the existence of residue on the item"
(R. 129:17 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-4(5)); R. 83).1
The magistrate ruled that where "the existence of residue on an item was one of
the factors that the legislature anticipated would be considered by the trier of fact in
determining whether an item was in fact paraphernalia[,]... the existence of residue on
the baggie could establish both the crime as a felony and a misdemeanor" (R. 74, 82).

1

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-4 (West 2004) sets forth various factors which, "in
addition to all other logically relevant factors," the trier of fact should consider "[i]n
determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia." Such statutory factors include
"[statements by an owner or by anyone in control of the object concerning its use,"
"[p]rior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object... under
[laws] relating to a controlled substance," "[t]he proximity of the object, in time and
space, to a direct violation of this chapter," "[t]he proximity of the object to a controlled
substance," "[t]he existence of any residue of a controlled substance on the object," and
eight other factors. See id.
3

Thus, according to the magistrate, "under State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969),
and its progeny, the court was obligated to bind the defendant over on the misdemeanor"
(R. 74, 82).
The State filed a Motion to Reconsider Preliminary Hearing Bindover (R. 82).
Defendant replied with a Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider (Id). The
magistrate denied the State's motion on the ground that both charges were supported by
the methamphetamine residue:
Since the existence of residue is the only evidence that can support a charge
of either possession of drug paraphernalia or possession of a controlled
substance, then the exact conduct is being prohibited. Therefore, the
Shondel Doctrine does apply in this case and the Defendant must be
charged with the offense carrying the lesser penalty.
(R. 81 (emphasis in original); R. 74). Defendant was thus bound over on one count of
possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor, and one
count of absconding, a third degree felony (R. 81).
The State petitioned for interlocutory appeal (R. 86-112). The supreme court
transferred the State's petition to this Court for disposition (R. 114). This Court granted
the State's petition. See Order dated March 9, 2005.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Under State v. Shondel and its progeny, if two statutes define exactly the same
penal offense, a defendant may be sentenced only under the statute providing the lesser
penalty. The doctrine applies only when two statutes are wholly duplicative as to the
elements of their crimes. If either statute requires proof of an element not required by the
other, the Shondel doctrine does not apply.
4

The elements of possession of a controlled substance, a felony, are not exactly the
same as the elements of possession of drug paraphernalia, a misdemeanor. Therefore, the
magistrate erred in concluding that Shondel required dismissal of the greater crime in
favor of the lesser.
ARGUMENT
THE MAGISTRATE ERRED IN APPLYING SHONDEL WHEN HE
CONCLUDED THAT METHAMPHETAMINE FOUND IN THE
RESIDUE OF A PLASTIC BAGGIE COULD ONLY SUPPORT A
POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA CHARGE, NOT A
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE CHARGE,
WHERE THE STATUTES DEFINING THOSE CRIMES DO NOT
CRIMINALIZE "EXACTLY THE SAME CONDUCT"
Because the elements of possession of a controlled substance, a felony, are not
exactly the same as the elements of possession of drug paraphernalia, a misdemeanor, the
magistrate erred in concluding that it was obligated under Shondel to dismiss the greater
crime in favor of the lesser. Therefore, this Court should reverse the magistrate's ruling
and order that defendant be bound over on the possession of a controlled substance
charge.2
"'In State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), and its progeny,
[Utah's courts] have held that where two statutes define exactly the same penal offense, a

The possession of a controlled substance count originally charged in this case
was enhanced to a first degree felony because the crime was committed in a drug-free
zone and defendant had prior convictions (R. 59-60). The possession of drug
paraphernalia charge, on which defendant was actually bound over, was also enhanced
because the crime was committed in a drug-free zone (R. 81). However, because the
enhancements for neither crime impact analysis of the crimes under the Shondel doctrine,
the State applies the doctrine to the crimes absent enhancements.
5

defendant can be sentenced only under the statute requiring the lesser penalty." State v.
Bluff, 2002 UT 66, f 33, 52 P.3d 1210 (citing Shondel, 453 P.2d at 147-48), cert denied,
537 U.S.I 172 (2003); see also State v. Green 2000 UT App 33, \ 6, 995 P.2d 1250.
Our courts have repeatedly stated that the Shondel doctrine "necessarily applies
only when the two statutes address 'exactly the same conduct.'" Bluff 2002 UT 66, Tf 33
(quoting State v. Gomez, 722 P.2d 747, 749 (Utah 1986)); see also State v. Kent, 945 P.2d
145,147 (Utah App. 1997). In other words, the doctrine applies only when the two
statutes are "wholly duplicative as to the elements of the crime." State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d
257, 263 (Utah 1985). "[I]f one or both of the crimes at issue 'require[] proof of some
fact or element not required to establish the other,' the statutes do not criminalize
identical conduct and the State can charge an individual with the crime carrying the
higher classification or more severe sentence." State v. Federowicz, 2002 UT 67, ^f 47, 52
P.3d 1194 (citation omitted), cert denied, 537 U.S. 1123 (2003); Kent, 945 P.2d at 147.
In this case, defendant was charged with one count of possession of a controlled
substance based on methamphetamine found in the residue of a plastic baggie seized
from defendant's pants pocket (R. 59-60; R. 129:7). The magistrate ruled that, since the
methamphetamine evidence could also support a charge of possession of drug
paraphernalia, a lesser crime, it was obligated under Shondel to bind defendant over only
on the lesser possession of drug paraphernalia crime (R. 74, 81-82). Because the statutes
defining possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia are
not "wholly duplicative as to the elements of the crime," Bryan, 709 P.2d at 263, the
magistrate's ruling was erroneous.
6

Possession of a controlled substance is defined under Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2)(a)(i) (West 2004). That section provides that "[i]t is unlawful... for any person
knowingly and intentionally to possess or use . . . a controlled substance." Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i).
Thus, the elements of that crime are:
(1)
(2)

knowingly and intentionally
possessing or using

(3)

a controlled substance.

See id. The statute does not define a minimum amount of controlled substance necessary
to constitute a crime. See id. In fact, this Court has held that, if one possesses a
controlled substance in any amount, even an unuseable residual amount, one is guilty
under this statute. See State v. Vigh, 871 P.2d 1030, 1034-35 (Utah App. 1994)
(affirming conviction for possession of cocaine based on residue which was not
"measurable or quantifiable and was insufficient to produce a physical effect if
consumed"); State v. Warner, 788 P.2d 1041, 1043-44 (Utah App. 1990) (affirming
conviction for possession of methamphetamine based on residue found on vial).
Possession of drug paraphernalia is defined under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l)
(West 2004). That section provides:
It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture,
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack,
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a
controlled substance into the human body in violation of this chapter.
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Thus, the elements of that crime are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly
using or possessing with intent to use
drug paraphernalia3
to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture,
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, tes>t, analyze, pack,
repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise
introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation
of this chapter.

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37a-5(l) (defining possession of paraphernalia); 76-2-102
(West 2004) (defining culpable mental state required when statute defining offense does
not contain one).
A comparison of the elements of these crimes reveals that the statutes do not
criminalize the same conduct. Specifically, the crime of possession of a controlled
substance does not require proof of drug paraphernalia, and the crime of possession of
drug paraphernalia does not require proof of a controlled substance. Compare Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) with Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l). Thus, possession of drug
paraphernalia is not even a lesser-included offense of possession of a controlled

"Drug paraphernalia" is defined as
any equipment, product, or material used, or intended for use, to
plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert,
produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, package, repackage, store, contain,
conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or to otherwise introduce a controlled
substance into the human body in violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, and
includes, but is not limited to.. .containers used, or intended for use to
package small quantities of a controlled substance [or] to store or conceal a
controlled substance.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-3 (9), (10) (1999).
8

substance, let alone the same offense. See State v. Hill, 61A P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983)
(setting forth test to determine when one offense is lesser-included of another).
In determining that "the exact [same] conduct is being prohibited" under both
statutes (R. 81), the magistrate ignored the elements of the crimes as contained in their
defining statutes. The magistrate focused, instead, on the plastic baggie and "whether,"
under the statute identifying factors to consider in determining if an item is paraphernalia,
"the baggie would have been considered a drug paraphernalia without the presence of
residue" (R. 75). The magistrate wrote: "Since the existence of residue is the only
evidence that can support a charge of either possession of drug paraphernalia or
possession of a controlled substance, then the exact conduct is being prohibited," and
thus "the Shondel Doctrine does apply in this case" (R. 74, 81) (emphasis in original).
This Court rejected that very same analysis in State v. Sorensen, 2003 UT App 292
(unpublished, attached at Addendum C). In that case, Sorensen was charged with both
possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. See id. at Tf 4
(unnumbered). When the magistrate dismissed both charges after the preliminary
hearing, the State appealed, asserting that both charges should have survived bindover.
See id. at % 1 (unnumbered). In response, Sorensen claimed that, even if the magistrate
erred in dismissing all the drug-related charges, Sorensen still could not be charged with
both possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia because
both charges were based on methamphetamine residue found on the paraphernalia. See
id. at Tf 4 (unnumbered). This Court rejected Sorensen's claim:

9

However, the items could be considered paraphernalia even without the
residue because presence of residue is a factor, rather than a requirement, used in
determining whether an item is paraphernalia. See Utah Code Ann. § 5 8-3 7(a)4(5) (2002). Therefore, the residue can form the basis for the methamphetamine
charge, independent of the paraphernalia charge.
Id at f 4 (unnumbered); see also Kent, 945 P.2d at 147 ("While the statutes criminalizing
forgery, insurance fraud, and communications fraud provide that these crimes may be
accomplished through the use of a computer, the use of a computer is not an essential
element of these crimes," and therefore, the statutes "are not wholly duplicative, [and] the
Shondel rule does not apply.").
As in Sorensen, the fact that the residue in the plastic baggie could support charges
for both the greater crime of possession of a controlled substance and the lesser crime of
possession of drug paraphernalia does not mean that defendant may only be charged with
the lesser crime under Shondel. Rather, because the elements of those two crimes are not
exactly the same, Shondel does not even apply. See Bluff, 2002 UT 66, If 33;
Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, \ 47; Green, 2000 UT App 33, \ 6; Kent, 945 P.2d at 147;
Bryan, 109?.2d at 263.
Because the elements of possession of a controlled substance are not "wholly
duplicative," Bryan, 709 P.2d at 263, of the elements of possession of drug paraphernalia,
the magistrate erred under Shondel in dismissing the first degree felony possession of a
controlled substance charge and replacing it with a misdemeanor possession of drug
paraphernalia charge.

10

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to reverse the magistrate's order
and order that defendant be bound over for the possession of a controlled substance in a
drug-free zone with priors, a first degree felony, and absconding, a third degree felony.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 3~ July 2005.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK/
Assistant Attorney General
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Addenda

Addendum A

Addendum A

Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, & ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 041403028
BRANDON WILLIAMS,
Judge Steven L. Hansen
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on September 28,2004, for a preliminary hearing. At the
conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the Court bound the defendant over to stand trial on Count 1
Possession of Paraphernalia in a Drug Free Zone, a class A misdemeanor and Count 2 Absconding,
a third degree felony. On September 30,2004, the plaintiff filed a Motion to Reconsider the Bindover.
The Court, having reviewed the Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider the Bindover does hereby make and
enter the following Finding of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Order.

FINDINGS OF FACTS
1. On September 28, 2004, a preliminary hearing was conducted wherein the defendant
Brandon Williams ("Williams") was present and represented by Richard Gale. The plaintiff was
represented by Deputy Utah County Attorney, Timothy L. Taylor.

fiCS

2. At the preliminary hearing the plaintiff called Deputy Daniel Forster from the Utah County
Sheriffs Office to testify. Deputy Forster testified that on or about July 27,2004, he received a call
from an anonymous person saying Williams was possibly engaged in dealing drugs and that Williams
was not going to return to the jail at the conclusion of his temporary release. Deputy Forster contacted
the Utah County Jail and was informed that Brandon Williams had received a temporary release from
custody by a judge from the Fourth District Court and was required to return on July 29, 2004, by
5:00 p.m.
3. At approximately 10:00 p.m. on July 29, 2004, Deputy Forster checked with the Utah
County Jail and determined that Williams had not returned to the jail. In addition to William's failure
to return to jail, Deputy Forster discovered an outstanding felony warrant for Williams issued out of
the 5th District Court of Utah.
4. Deputy Forster obtained a photo of Williams from the Utah County Jail's booking system
and responded to 939 E. 300 S. in Provo with Deputy Cory Wride in attempt to make contact with
Williams. Deputy Forster knocked on the door at the residence and Williams answered. Deputy
Forster was able to immediately take Williams into custody.
5. In searching Williams incident to his arrest, Deputy Forster located a small baggie
containing a crystal substance in Williams' right pants pocket. Williams stated that he didn't know
what was in the baggie and denied the baggie belonged to him.
6. Deputy Forster testified he submitted the baggie to the Utah State Crime Laboratory for
testing. The test results from the crime lab were identified by Deputy Forster, marked as Exhibit #2
and received into evidence without obj ection. The crime lab report indicated "Methamphetamine was
identified in the residue in the plastic bag."
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7. Deputy Forster testified that the state crime lab will weigh a substance if the amount is
sufficient to weigh, and that the scales at the crime laboratory can weigh substances in amounts as
small as milligrams. Deputy Forster also admitted that the crime lab only refers to a substance as
residue if the amount is insufficient to weigh with their scales.
8. In addition to providing the court with the test results from the crime lab, Deputy Forster
retrieved the baggie he received back from the crime lab, and the court was able to view the baggie.
9. Deputy Forster testified that Williams was arrested within 1,000 feet of a public park and
an LDS church increasing the penalty for possessing controlled substances in a drug free zone.
10. The plaintiff provided the court with documents indicating Williams had two prior
convictions for controlled substances. The plaintiff marked the convictions as Exhibits #3 and #4 and
the exhibits were received without objection.
11. The defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine Deputy Forster.
12. Counsel for the defendant cited Utah Code Annotated Section 5 8-3 7a-4(5) and argued that
the legislature anticipated the existence of drug residue on an item of drug paraphernalia because
section 58-37a-4(5) cites "the existence of any residue of a controlled substance on the object" as one
of the factors that the trier of fact is to consider when determining whether an item is drug
paraphernalia.
13. Counsel for the defendant further argued that a baggie alone is an innocuous item which
has many legitimate purposes, therefore the baggie could not be considered drug paraphernalia
without the presence of the controlled substance residue.
14. Counsel for the defendant further argued that because the baggie could not be considered
drug paraphernalia without the existence of the residue, and since the same conduct could be punished
as either possession of drug paraphernalia or possession of a controlled substance, Count 1 of the
Information should be bound over as possession of drug paraphernalia. The plaintiff asked the court
to bind the defendant over as charged in the Information.
3
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15. The court determined that based on the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, the
baggie only contained residue. The court further determined that the existence of residue on an item
was one of the factors that the legislature anticipated would be considered by the trier of fact in
determining whether an item was in fact paraphernalia. The court concluded because the existence
of residue on the baggie could establish both the crime as a felony and a misdemeanor, under State
v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), and its progeny, the court was obligated to bind the defendant
over on the misdemeanor.
16. The court did not bind the defendant over for trial on Count 1 Possession of a Controlled
Substance in a Drug Free Zone with Prior Convictions, a first degree felony, but bound the defendant
over to stand trial on Possession of Drug Paraphernalia in a Drug Free Zone, a class A misdemeanor.
The court also bound the defendant over to stand trial on Count 2 Absconding, a third degree felony.
17. On September 30, 2004, the plaintiff filed a Motion to Reconsider Preliminary Hearing
Bindover.
18. On October 1, 2004, the defendant filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Motion to
Reconsider.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
On November 17, 2004, the court issued a Memorandum Decision denying the Plaintiffs
Motion to Reconsider the Preliminary Hearing Bindover. The Court considered whether the baggie
would have been considered a drug paraphernalia without the presence of residue. The Court
concluded that under Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37a-4(5) there are 13 factors which the trier
of fact may consider in determining whether an item is drug paraphernalia, and the state only argued
one factor, the existence of a controlled substance residue. Under these facts, as distinguished from
the cases cited by the state, the court held that because the baggie could not be considered

4

paraphernalia without the existence of the residue then the' Shondel Doctrine," as set forth in the case
of State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), applied to the present case.
The court reasoned that "a single object [may or] may not be sufficient for a determination of
being a drug paraphernalia, but the close proximity of an item to additional paraphernalia and drugs
increases the probability that the item in question is a drug paraphernalia, with or without the
existence of residue. The court ruled, "Since the existence of residue is the only evidence that can
support a charge of either possession of drug paraphernalia or possession of a controlled substance,
then the exact conduct is being prohibited. Therefore, the Shondel Doctrine does apply in this case
and the Defendant must be charged with the offense carrying the lesser penalty."
ORDER
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the court hereby Orders that
Count 1 of the Information be bound over as Possession of Drug Paraphernalia in a Drag Free Zone,
a class A misdemeanor, and Count 2 be bound over as Absconding, a third degree felony. Defendant
is ordered to stand trial on the matters.

Signed this

Jy7 day of January, 2005.

Judge Steven L. Hansen ^,;
Fourth District Court Judge V<rvv>*'
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, ORDER to the following on the _\- daY of Jjaauaf?f2005:
Tim Taylor
Office of the Utah County Attorney
Richard Gale
Office of the Utah County Public Defender
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Addendum B

Addendum I

§ 58-37-8.

Prohibited acts—Penalties

(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent,
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which
results in any violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a,
37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate
occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or more persons with
respect to whom the person occupies a position of organizer, supervisor,
or any other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respec
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled s
analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is g
second degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction
of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is
a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction
of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class I
meanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty oi
degree felony.
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of SL
(l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indetermin
as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as de
Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person <
immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the
the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a ten
year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may ;
ally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not t<
five years to run consecutively and not concurrently.
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty
degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate ten
less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or exec
the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not elij
probation.

(2) Prohibited acts B—Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner
while acting in the course of his professional practice, or as otherwise
authorized by this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building,
room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and
intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those locations;
or
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or
forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second
degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is
more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance
analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin
from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less
than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any controlled
substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater
penalty than provided in this Subsection (2).
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and
upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third degree
felony.
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the
exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect to controlled substances as
listed in:
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for
an indeterminate term as provided by law, and:
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term
of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not
concurrently; and
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for
an indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally
sentence the person convicted to a term of six months to run consecutively
and not concurrently.

(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony.
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (4)(c) who, in an
offense not amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207:
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in
his body any measurable amount of a controlled substance; and
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent manner, causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601
or the death of another.
(3) Prohibited acts C—Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled
substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or
issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled
substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure
the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense
to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or
to procure the administration of any controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled
substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the
use of a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or
written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other
thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name,
or other-identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of
any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to render
any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third
degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D—Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under
this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under
Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under this Subsection (4) if
the trier of fact finds the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the
grounds of any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution
or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions;

(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure
or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity
sponsored by or through a school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i)
and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section
76-10-501;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie
house) playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in
Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii);
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of age,
regardless of where the act occurs; or
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport,
delivery, or distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an
inmate or on the grounds of any correctional facility as defined in Section
76-8-311.3.
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection
would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would
have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person
convicted under Subsection (2)(g) or this Subsection (4) is guilty of one
degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(d)(i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi):
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate
term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the
person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not
concurrently; and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not
concurrently; and
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person
who, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an
offense, directly or indirectly solicits, requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to commit a violation of Subsection (4)(a)(xi).
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the
time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the
actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred was not as
described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location where the act
occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B
misdemeanor.

(6)(a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another
state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the
person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance or
substances.
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing,
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and
supervision.
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance for use as
a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the
ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope
of his employment.
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall
be given effect without the invalid provision or application.

§ 58-37a-4.
phernalia

Considerations in determining whether object is drug para-

In determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia, the trier of fact, in
addition to all other logically relevant factors, should consider:
(1) Statements by an owner or by anyone in control of the object concerning
its use;
(2) Prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of anyone in control of the
object, under any state or federal law relating to a controlled substance;
(3) The proximity of the object, in time and space, to a direct violation of this
chapter;
(4) The proximity of the object to a controlled substance;
(5) The existence of any residue of a controlled substance on the object;
(6) Instructions whether oral or written, provided with the object concerning
its use;
(7) Descriptive materials accompanying the object which explain or depict its
use;
(8) National and local advertising concerning its use;
(9) The manner in which the object is displayed for sale;
(10) Whether the owner or anyone in control of the object is a legitimate
supplier of like or related items to the community, such as a licensed distributor
or dealer of tobacco products;
(11) Direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio of sales of the object to the
total sales of the business enterprise;
(12) The existence and scope of legitimate uses of the object in the community; and
(13) Expert testimony concerning its use.

§ 58~37a-5.

Unlawful acts

(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store,
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or
manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the
drug paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze,
pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act. 1 Any
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a
person under 18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the
person making the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper,
magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the
purpose of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
BENCH, Judge.
*1 At a preliminary hearing, bind-over is
appropriate if the prosecution presents evidence
establishing "probable cause to believe that the
crime charged has been committed and that the
defendant has committed it" Utah R Cnm P
7(h)(2), see also State v Clark, 2001 UT 9,1f 16,
20 P 3d 300 (eliminating the distinction between the
probable cause required for an arrest warrant and
the probable cause necessary to bind over). The
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, and all reasonable mferences are
drawn in favor of the prosecution. See id at Tf 10.
The evidence produced at a preliminary hearing
"need not be capable of supporting a finding of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id at ^ 15. Whether
probable cause exists to bind over a defendant for

trial is a question of law, reviewed on appeal
"without deference to the court below." State v
Schroyer, 2002 UT 26,1 8, 44 P 3d 730.
Although Defendant Sorensen was not m actual,
physical possession of the paraphernalia and
methamphetamme residue found in his house on
August 8, the prosecution alleges that he
constructively possessed both. The evidence
presented at the preliminary hearing demonstrates
probable cause to believe that Sorensen had "the
ability and the mtent to exercise dominion and
control"
over
the
paraphernalia
and
methamphetamme residue. State v Hansen, 732
P 2d 127, 132 (Utah 1987) For example, an officer
testified that Sorensen's ex-wife stated that the
bedroom where the c ontraband was found b elonged
to Sorensen and that "he had spent the [previous]
night there." [FN1] Further, Sorensen's day
planner, social security card, and other papers
beanng his name were found in the bedroom. When
viewed in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, with all reasonable inferences being
drawn m its favor, the evidence establishes the
requisite "nexus" between Sorensen and the
contraband to establish probable cause to have him
bound over for trial Id
FN1. In his appellate brief, Sorensen
argues that his ex-wife's statements should
not have been considered
at the
preliminary hearing because the statements
are unreliable and only reliable hearsay is
admissible
at
preliminary
hearings.
However, Sorensen failed to object to the
admissibility of the statements, and issues
not raised in the court below "cannot be
argued for the first time on appeal" unless
"exceptional circumstances" exist or "plain
error" occurred. State v Arguelles, 2003
UT l,f 41, 63 P.3d 731. Sorensen has
argued neither "exceptional circumstances"
nor "plain error." Id.
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As for the charges resulting from the events of
August 20, a positive urine analysis alone, without
corroborating evidence, is sufficient to establish
probable cause to believe that Sorensen possessed
methamphetamine and morphine. [FN2] Cf. State v.
Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466, 468 n. 2 (Utah
Ct.App.1988) (recognizing decisions from other
jurisdictions where the presence of alcohol or
controlled substance in a person's urine did not
establish possession beyond a reasonable doubt).
Utah's statute defining possession of controlled
substances clearly includes "inhalation, swallowing,
injection, or consumption." Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-2(l)(dd) (2002).
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FN2. This, of course, does not preclude the
possibility of establishing, at trial, that the
presence of morphine was attributable to
Sorensen's valid prescription for Lortab.
In response, Sorensen claims that he cannot be
charged with both possession of methamphetamine
and possession of paraphernalia because the
methamphetamine charge stems from the presence
of residue on the items the prosecution claims are
paraphernalia. However, the items could be
considered paraphernalia even without the residue
because presence of residue is a factor, rather than a
requirement, used in determining whether an item is
paraphernalia. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-4(5)
(2002). Therefore, the residue can form the basis
for the methamphetamine charge, independent of
the paraphernalia charge. Finally, Sorensen's
reliance on Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 1999 UT
App 61, 975 P.2d 501, is misplaced because Bryan
addressed the s tandard of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt rather than probable cause.
*2 Accordingly, we reverse and remand the case
for further proceedings.
I CONCUR: NORMAN H. JACKSON, Presiding
Judge.
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: JAMES Z. DAVIS,
Judge.
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